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Abstract
In this paper, we aim to understand the generalization properties of generative
adversarial networks (GANs) from a new perspective of privacy protection. Theo-
retically, we prove that a differentially private learning algorithm used for training
the GAN does not overfit to a certain degree, i.e., the generalization gap can be
bounded. Moreover, some recent works, such as the Bayesian GAN, can be re-
interpreted based on our theoretical insight from privacy protection. Quantitatively,
to evaluate the information leakage of well-trained GAN models, we perform vari-
ous membership attacks on these models. The results show that previous Lipschitz
regularization techniques are effective in not only reducing the generalization gap
but also alleviating the information leakage of the training dataset.
1 Introduction
In the past years, generative adversarial networks (GANs) [11] have achieved remarkable progress in
a wide range of applications including image translation [40, 16], image manipulation [39, 6], and
image super-resolution [36, 20], etc. More recently, numerous advanced techniques [1, 21, 22, 38]
are proposed for improving and stabilizing the training of GANs, leading to more realistic generated
images.
Despite the tremendous success, there are still numerous open problems to be fully solved, ranging
from the theoretical analysis of different regularization techniques [22, 28] to the visualization of
different objective functions of GANs [3]. Among these problems, a critical one is how to formally
characterize the generalization ability of GANs. Some recent studies attempted to explore this
problem in different contexts. For instance, a seminal work in this direction [2] proposed the neural
net distance, and the authors further showed the generalization properties of this distance. Qi et al.
[25] were motivated by the progress in the Lipschitz regularization and proposed a loss-sensitive
GAN. They then developed the Lipschitz regularization theory to analyze the generalization ability
of the loss-sensitive GAN.
Different from the prior works [25, 2], in this paper, we aim to study the generalization ability of
GANs in a relatively general setting from a novel perspective of privacy protection. Our study is
motivated by a well-known intuition [37], “reducing the generalization gap” and “protecting the
individual’s privacy” share the same goal of encouraging a neural network to learn the population’s
features instead of memorizing the features of each individual, i.e., the smaller the generalization gap
is, the less information of the training dataset will be revealed. The goal of this paper is to validate
this natural intuition theoretically and quantitatively.
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In the theoretical side, we leverage the stability-based theory [30] to bridge the gap between differen-
tial privacy [10] and the generalization, i.e., a differentially private learning algorithm does not overfit
to a certain degree. Based on the theoretical analysis, we also provide a new perspective from privacy
protection to understand a number of recent techniques for improving the performance of GANs, e.g.,
various Lipschitz regularization terms [12, 22] and training GANs using Bayesian learning [27, 14].
In the experimental side, we quantitatively validate the relationship between the generalization gap
and the information leakage of the training dataset. To this end, we introduce the membership attack
[31] to evaluate the information leakage of a trained GAN model. In the context of machine learning,
the membership attack refers to inferring whether a specific item is from the training dataset while
given the trained model (discriminator and generator in our case). Specifically, we design different
attack models and perform membership attacks on GANs trained with various objective functions and
regularization terms. The results show that previous Lipschitz regularization techniques are effective
in not only reducing the generalization gap but also alleviating the information leakage of the training
dataset, which implicitly validates the aforementioned intuition. The results also suggest that it is
possible to design new variants of GAN from the perspective of building privacy-preserving learning
algorithms, which can bring significant regularization effects while provide appealing property of
protecting the sensitive information contained in the training dataset.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We first briefly review related works in Section 2.
Then we demonstrate our theoretical analysis in Section 3. Subsequently, we present the quantitative
analysis in Section 4. At last, we conclude this work in Section 5.
2 Related Work
Generative adversarial networks. In the past years, starting from the illuminative work of
GANs [11], many efforts have been devoted to this research area. Numerous researchers have
tried to improve the performance of GANs from different perspectives [1, 25, 24, 22]. One direction
is to improve the original objective function [25, 1, 24]. For example, to solve the gradient vanishing
problem, the Least-square GAN [21] proposed using the least square loss function in the training of
GANs. Wasserstein GAN (WGAN) [1] replaced the original Jensen–Shannon (JS) divergence with
the Wasserstein distance and proposed an effective approximation method to compute the distance.
Besides the improvements on the objective function, lots of algorithmic tricks have been proposed
in empirical studies of training GANs. A typical direction is to add Lipschitz constraints on the
discriminator, which enables the discriminator to be Lipschitz continuous with respect to the input
and the weight. For instance, WGAN proposed using weight clipping to constrain the Lipschitz
constant [1]. Gulrajani et al. [12] further suggested to use the gradient penalty to obtain better
performance. Miyato et al. [22] took a different angle to regularize the spectra of the weight matrix
which can implicitly constrain the Lipschitz constant.
Among these empirical techniques in training GANs, some researchers focus on building the theoreti-
cal framework to analyze the properties of GANs under different assumptions. Here we focus on the
works of studying the generalization properties of GANs. Specifically, Arora et al. [2] argued that the
objective function of the original GAN does not provide a theoretical generalization guarantee. As a
result, the authors turned into analyzing the generalization gap of their proposed neural network dis-
tance. Qi et al. [25] developed a set of theoretical tools to analyze the generalization of GANs under
the assumption of Lipschitz continuous of the discriminator. In practical, to meet the assumption,
they designed a novel objective function to directly minimize the Lipschitz constant.
Membership attacks towards deep learning algorithms. Recently, membership attacks have
arisen as a common threat model against machine learning algorithms and attained increasing
attraction from the research community [32, 31, 5, 13]. A pioneer work [31] investigated the risk of
membership attacks on different machine learning models. Specifically, they developed a shadow
training technique to obtain an attack model in the black-box setting (i.e., without knowing the
machine learning model structure and parameters). Carlini et al. [5] proposed a metric to measure the
vulnerability of deep learning models. In the context of GANs, Hayes et al. [13] studied membership
attacks against GANs in both black-box and white-box settings. In this paper, we use the membership
attack to assess the information leakage of the dataset used for training GAN models.
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3 Theoretical Analysis
In this part, we aim to bridge the gap between the privacy protection and the generalization ability
of GANs. At a high level, we prove that a differentially private learning mechanism (i.e. training
algorithm) does not overfit to a certain extent. The core idea is based on the stability-based theory [30].
To this end, we first introduce some basic notations in GANs. Then we present the theoretical analysis
to characterize the generalization ability of GANs from the perspective of privacy protection. At last,
based on our theoretical insight from privacy protection, we show a new interpretation of the previous
theoretical results of uniform convergence [2], as well as the recent efforts on the Bayesian GAN.
Preliminaries. The GAN framework consists of a generator and a discriminator. We denoteHG and
HD as the hypothesis spaces of the generator and discriminator, respectively. In practice, we make
use of neural networks to build HG and HD. Formally, we have HG = {g(z; θg), θg ∈ Rp} and
HD = {d(x; θd), θd ∈ Rq}, where g and d are multi-layer convolutional neural networks. θg and θd
are the corresponding weight parameters. The training of GANs can be seen as playing a min-max
game to solve the following optimization problem:
min
θg
max
θd
Ex∼pdata [φ(d(x; θd))] + Ez∼pz [φ(1− d(g(z; θg); θd))] (1)
The above formulation can be seen as an extended version of the objective function used in the vanilla
GAN [11]. According to previous literature [2], we call function φ the measuring function. Note that
setting φ(t) = log(t) leads to the objective function used in the work of the original GAN [11], while
the recent WGAN [1] proposed using φ(t) = t.
To optimize Equation 1, we need to build two learning mechanisms Ad and Ag . During the training,
we alternately run Ad and Ag to seek an equilibrium (θ∗d, θ∗g). Specifically, Ad tries to find θ∗d such
that it maximizes the expected loss of the discriminator:
U(θd, θ
∗
g) = Ex∼pdata [φ(d(x; θd))] + Ez∼pz [φ(1− d(g(z; θ∗g); θd))] (2)
and Ag tries to find θ∗g to minimize the expected loss of the generator:
V (θ∗d, θg) = Ez∼pz [φ(1− d(g(z; θg); θ∗d))] (3)
Empirical loss and generalization. The optimization of Equation 2 and 3 can not be directly solved
since the expectation over the distribution of the true data pdata is intractable. Instead, we approximate
them with empirical loss on a set of i.i.d. real data samples S = {x1, x2, · · · , xm} and noise vectors
Z = {z1, z2, · · · , zm} drawn from pdata and pz , respectively2. We denote the resulted empirical
versions of Equation 2 and 3 as Uˆ and Vˆ . In this empirical setting, the learning mechanisms Ad and
Ag turn into the role as the empirical loss optimizers, which are to optimize the empirical loss Uˆ and
Vˆ , i.e., finding (θˆ∗d, θˆ
∗
g). To study the generalization property of the learning mechanisms, we need to
evaluate the generalization gap between the empirical and expected objective losses. In this paper, we
mainly focus on the analysis of Equation 2 since our viewpoint is from the privacy protection and
Equation 3 does not explicitly touch the original training data. As a common practice shown in the
prior work [11], we analyze Equation 2 when θ∗g is given. Formally, we define the generalization gap
as follows (we take the discriminator loss U as an example):
FU (Ad) = Eθd∼Ad(S)ES∼pmdata [Uˆ(θd, θ∗g)− U(θd, θ∗g)] (4)
where S ∼ pmdata denotes sampling m training samples from the oracle distribution pdata. In the
above equation, we take the expectation with respect to the randomness in the learning mechanism
and also in the sampling process similar to the literature [23, 35]. Note that we can infinitely sample
from pz (e.g. a uniform distribution) and pz is irrelevant to the original training data (i.e. sampling
from pz does not induce the leakage of the training dataset). As a result, we omit the second term in
the RHS of Equation 2 and focus on studying the first term.
Privacy protection and generalization bound. To bridge the gap between privacy protection and
the generalization bound, we need to characterize how an algorithm can protect privacy, i.e., the
amount of information leakage of the training dataset. Differential privacy [9] is seen as a gold
standard for privacy protection in the security community. It provides a rigorous bound on privacy
2In practice, we always sample different Z while S is fixed at each training round.
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cost of the algorithm, even in the worst case. The definition of differential privacy is based on the
adjacent datasets. Two datasets are adjacent when they differ in a single element. Then we can
introduce differential privacy as follows:
Define 1 (Differential privacy) A randomized algorithm A : D → R satisfies -differential privacy
if for any two adjacent datasets S,S ′ ⊆ D and for any subset of outputs O ⊆ R it holds:
Pr[A(S) ∈ O] ≤ ePr[A(S ′) ∈ O] (5)
In our setting, A can be the training algorithm (i.e. Ad). Intuitively, Equation 5 indicates that
participation of one individual sample in the training phase has a negligible effect on the final weight
parameters. A relevant concept is uniform RO-stable of an algorithm. An algorithm is stable if a
small change to the input causes a limited change in the output. Here, RO denotes “replace one
element in the input“. The above description is made formally as:
Define 2 (Uniform RO-stability) The randomized algorithm A is uniform RO-stable with respect to
the discriminator loss function (Equation 2) in our case, if for all adjacent datasets S, S′, it holds
that:
sup
x∈S
|Eθd∼A(S)[φ(d(x; θd))]− Eθd∼A(S′)[φ(d(x; θd))]| ≤ stable(m) (6)
A well-known heuristic observation is that differential privacy implies uniform stability. The prior
work [35] has formlized this observation into the following lemma:
Lemma 1 (Differential privacy ⇒ uniform RO-stability) If a randomized algorithm A is -
differentially private, then the algorithm A satisfies (e − 1)-RO-stability.
The stability of the algorithm is also related to the generalization gap. Numerous studies [30, 23]
focus on exploring the relationship in various settings. Formally, we have the following lemma:
Lemma 2 If an algorithm A is uniform RO-stable with rate stable(m), then |FU (A)| (Equation 4)
can be bounded: |FU (A)| ≤ stable(m).
Intuitively, the more stable the algorithm is, the better its generalization ability will be. We take a
further step to build the connection between differential privacy and the generalization gap. This can
be done via combining the above two lemmas. Formally, we introduce Theorem 3 as follows:
Theorem 1 (Generalization gap) If an algorithm A satisfies -differential privacy, then the general-
ization gap can be bounded by a data-independent constant.
The proof can be accomplished by following the roadmap: Differential privacy ⇒ Stability ⇒
Generalization. The proof details can be found in Appendix. By applying Theorem 3 to Ad,
we can show that the generalizability of the discriminator is ensured when the training algorithm
satisfies -differential privacy. Note that we focus on the generalization of the discriminator loss,
since the optimization of Equation 3 does not touch the original data. We can easily obtain the similar
generalization bound of the generator by leveraging the post-processing property of the differential
privacy protocol [10].
Theorem 3 not only enables characterizing GAN’s generalizability from the viewpoint of privacy
protection, but also helps to understand previous techniques for improving the generalization of
GANs. A typical example is the Lipschitz regularization technique. Previous studies propose
implementing the regularization from various angles [1, 25, 22]. For instance, the loss-sensitive
GAN [25] designed a novel objective loss to restrict the discriminator to satisfy the Lipschitz condition.
Spectral normalization [22] explored this direction by adding regularization on the weight parameters.
And WGAN [1] proposed using gradient penalty to constrain the magnitude of the gradient, which
further implicitly led to the Lipschitz condition. From the perspective of differential privacy, the
Lipschitz condition for the outputs is also a crucial ingredient for building a differentially private
algorithm. We also infer that adding Lipschitz constraints implicitly leads to stability of the algorithm,
which can further be used for reducing the generalization gap (see more details in the evaluation
section).
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Above analysis focuses on the discriminator loss U . As mentioned above, it is natural to extend the
analysis to the generator loss since the optimization of the generator loss does not touch the original
training dataset and we can leverage the post-processing property of the differential privacy. We can
further study the whole optimization procedure of the GAN, i.e., the alternative running of Ad and
Ag . These can be accomplished by the composition theory in adaptive learning theory [7], we mark
this as the future work.
Revisiting previous results on uniform convergence. Previous works attempted to explore the
uniform convergence with respect to different objective functions. For example, Qi et al. [25] proposed
the loss-sensitive GAN and proved the uniform convergence with respect to the discriminator loss.
Arora et al. proposed the neural distance to analyze the generalization property (uniform convergence)
of GANs. Note that both of them focus on the special form of the GAN or the objective function. In
this paper, based on the aforementioned theoretical results, we can prove the uniform convergence of
the discriminator loss when the training algorithm satisfies the differential privacy protocol. Formally,
we have the following theorem:
Theorem 2 (Uniform convergence): Suppose Ad satisfies -differential privacy and d(k)(x; θ(k)d )
be the output of Ad at the k-th iteration. Then, ∀k, the generalization gap with respect to dk can be
bounded by a universal constant which is related to .
The proof of the above theorem can be done via combing the post-processing property [10] of
differential privacy and McDiarmid’s inequality [33]. The details can be found in Appendix.
Connection to Bayesian GAN. Recently, training GANs using Bayesian learning has emerged as
a new way to avoid mode collapse [27]. A well-known interpretation of mode collapse is that
the generator/discriminator has memorized some examples from the training dataset. Hence, the
memorization phenomenon can also breach the privacy of individuals in the training dataset. Thus,
we infer that the effectiveness of the Bayesian GAN may come from preventing information leakage
of the training dataset. In what follows, we briefly introduce how we validate this conjecture with
our theoretical results. Specifically, we take a recent work [27] as an example. In the work, the
authors proposed using stochastic Hamiltonian Monte Carlo (HMC) to marginalize the posterior
distribution of the weight parameters of both generator and discriminator. We have noted that Wang
et al. [34] pointed out that sampling one element from a posterior distribution can implicitly satisfy
differential privacy. Based on their results, we can prove that the HMC sampling also preserves
differential privacy with minor modification (refers to Section 4 in [34]), and then the Bayesian GAN
can implicitly preserve the differential privacy. Thus we are not surprised that the Bayesian GAN can
alleviate mode collapse in GANs since its connection to differential privacy mentioned above.
4 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we quantitatively validate the connection between the generalizability and the privacy
protection/information leakage of GANs by investigating some of the most popular GAN models. In
the theoretical analysis, we focus on the differentially private learning algorithms. While in practice,
differential privacy is a strict requirement for most of the existing GANs so that we focus on studying
information leakage of GANs instead. In particular, we note that adding Lipschitz constraints on the
discriminator has recently emerged as an effective solution for improving the generalization ability
of such GANs, thus we aim to study the effects of various regularization techniques for adding the
Lipschitz constraints. In a nutshell, our results show that the Lipschitz constraints not only reduce the
generalization gap but also make the trained model resistant to the membership attacks which are
used for detecting the sensitive information contained in the training dataset.
This section is structured as follows. First, we will introduce the experimental settings including the
datasets and the choice of different hyper-parameters. Then, we demonstrate our main results on
different datasets. At last, we provide some discussions on the attack methods and the regularization
techniques.
4.1 Experimental Setup
Datasets. We conduct experiments on a face image dataset and a real clinical dataset, namely,
Labeled Faces in the Wild (LFW) [19] which consists of 13,233 face images, and the IDC dataset
5
which is publicly available for invasive ductal carcinoma (IDC) classification3 and contains 277,524
patches of 50× 50 pixels (198,738 IDC-negative and 78,786 IDC-positive).
Model setup. Note that we focus on studying the effects of different regularization techniques
instead of the architecture design of the GAN model, thus we use the same generator architecture and
the same discriminator architecture in all experiments. Specifically, we adopt DCGAN following
most of previous works [26]. More details can be found in the work [26]. We set the size of the
generated image to 64x64 for the LFW dataset and 32x32 for the IDC dataset, respectively. As for
optimization, we use Adam [17] in all experiments, and use different hyper-parameters for different
training strategies. To be specific, we make use of Adam for the GAN trained with JS divergence.
The learning rates is set to 0.0004 for the GAN trained without any regularization terms (original
GAN [11]), while for other GANs (e.g. trained using Wasserstein distance), the learning rate is set to
0.0002. More details of hyper-parameter settings (e.g. β in Adam) can be found in Appendix. We
trained all the models for 400 epochs on both datasets.
Attack setup. We make use of membership attacks for evaluating the information leakage of the
GAN model. We build the attack model based on the output of the discriminator, which is a bounded
function. We suppose d(x; θd) ≤ b for all x in Equation 1. This assumption naturally holds in the
context of GAN (e.g. b = 1 for the original GAN). This is also a common assumption in many
previous works. Here, letting b = 1 suffices to all our cases. We then assume that the attacker A
has access to the trained GAN model, i.e. the discriminator and generator. Note that the notation
A is different from the previous ones that denote training algorithms. The goal of the attacker is to
determine whether a record (an image in our case) in the attack testing dataset is from the original
training dataset. Based on the above setting, the attack model proceeds as follows:
• Given the discriminator d(x; θd) and an image from the attack testing dataset.
• A firstly sets a threshold t ∈ (0, 1).
• A outputs 1 if d(x; θd)/b ≥ t, otherwise, it outputs 0.
where the output of 1 indicates that the input image is from the training dataset.
To evaluate the performance of the attack model, we need to build the attack testing dataset. For the
LFW dataset, we randomly choose 50% of images as the original training dataset to train the GAN
model. We build the attack testing dataset by mixing the original training dataset and the remaining
images. For the IDC dataset, we only use the positive part of the dataset. Since the data provider
has already provided a partition of training and testing datasets [15] (22,383 images in the training
dataset and 14,157 images in the testing dataset4), we directly use the original partition and build the
attack testing dataset by mixing the training and testing datasets. We then treat the above attack as a
binary classification model and evaluate its performance based on the F1 score and the AUC5 value.
To compute the F1 score, we assume the attacker has obtained the average value of d(x; θd) on the
training dataset. Thus we can set the average value as the threshold t and then compute the F1 score
at this threshold.
4.2 Results on LFW and IDC Datasets
Here, we present the results of our evaluation on the GAN models trained with different strategies. We
conduct extensive experiments of different settings. Specifically, we focus on three commonly used
techniques for adding Lipschitz constraints, namely, weight clipping [1], gradient penalty [28], and
spectral normalization [22]. For weight clipping, we set the clip interval as [−0.01, 0.01] following
the prior work [1]. We combine these regularization techniques with two types of objective functions,
the traditional JS divergence (setting φ(t) = log(t)) and the Wasserstein distance (setting φ(t) = t).
As mentioned above, the performance of the attack model is measured by the F1 score and AUC
value, and we use the gap between the testing and training losses to estimate the generalization gap.
We also calculate the Inception score [28], which is a commonly used for assessing the quality of the
generated images in previous works. The overall results are shown in Table 1.
3http://www.andrewjanowczyk.com/use-case-6-invasive-ductal-carcinoma-idc-segmentation/
4They also provide a validation dataset and we did not use it in our experiments.
5Area under the ROC curve
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Table 1: Evaluation results of DCGAN trained with different strategies. IS denotes the Inception
score. N/A indicates that the strategy leads to failure/collapse of the training. The last row presents
the Inception scores of the real data (training images of these two datasets).
Strategy LFW IDCF1 AUC Gap IS F1 AUC Gap IS
-JS divergence-
Original 0.565 0.729 0.581 3.067 0.445 0.531 0.138 2.148
Weight Clipping 0.486 0.501 0.113 3.112 0.378 0.502 0.053 2.083
Spectral Normalization 0.482 0.506 0.106 3.104 0.416 0.508 0.124 2.207
Gradient Penalty N/A N/A
-Wasserstein-
W/o clipping N/A N/A
Weight Clipping 0.484 0.512 0.042 3.013 0.388 0.513 0.045 1.912
Spectral Normalization 0.515 0.505 0.017 3.156 0.415 0.507 0.013 2.196
Gradient Penalty 0.492 0.503 0.031 2.994 0.426 0.504 0.017 1.974
IS (Real data) 4.272 3.061
LFW. We first conduct contrastive experiments on the GAN trained using JS divergence (setting
φ(x) = log(x) in Equation 1). As shown in Table 1, the plain model (trained without any regulariza-
tion term) is more vulnerable than those trained with different regularizers. The plain model leaks
some information of the training dataset, which results in the F1 score of 0.565 and the AUC value of
0.729 (greater than 0.5), respectively. While various regularization techniques are used for training
the GAN, the attack performance decreases drastically. For instance, while spectral normalization is
used, the F1 score is dropped from 0.565 to 0.482, and the AUC value is dropped to 0.506, which
approximates to the random guess. Along with the decrease of the attack performance, we also
observe a consistent decrease in the generalization gap (Gap in Table 1). For example, the gap is
decreased from 0.581 to 0.106 while spectral normalization is used.
In addition to these metrics, we also calculate the Inception score of each model. As shown in Table 1,
the Inception score of the LFW dataset (shown in the last row of Table 1) is much smaller than the
commonly used benchmarks (e.g. Cifar10 [18] and ImageNet [8]). This is because that the Inception
score is calculated by the model pre-trained by the images in ImageNet in which the image always
contains general objects (such as animals) while the image in LFW always contains one face. We
observe that the spectral normalization can generate images with higher visual qualities but obtain
lower Inception score than the weight clipping strategy (see generated images in Appendix). Thus,
these numerical results of Inception score indicate that Inception score is not suitable for some image
generation tasks and we need to design a specific metric for a given task. Among these experiments,
we also conduct the same attack experiments on GANs trained using Wasserstein distance and observe
similar phenomena as shown in Table 1.
IDC. The images in the IDC dataset contain various tissues and all of these tissues have similar
shapes and colors. As a result, performing the attack on the IDC dataset is more challenging than
on other datasets which consist of some concrete objects (e.g. LFW and Cifar10 [18]). As we can
see in Table 1, in all cases, the attack performance on IDC is lower than the performance on LFW in
terms of the F1 score and AUC value. We also provide some quantitative analysis to interpret the
performance drop in the following subsection. Despite the performance drop, we can still observe the
effectiveness of different regularizers in reducing the generalization gap and information leakage.
For example, with the use of spectral normalization, AUC drops from 0.531 to 0.508 and F1 score
decreases from 0.445 to 0.416. Another notable thing is that training the GAN using Wasserstein
distance without weight clipping can lead to the failure of training. This may be caused by the
gradient explosion since there is no activation function to compress the output values of the last layer
of the discriminator in Wasserstein GAN (in contrast, the original GAN used the sigmoid function for
the compression purpose). For the results of Inception score, we can observe an obvious decrease
from the LFW dataset to the IDC dataset. This may be caused by the difference of contents contained
in the images (tissues in IDC images and faces in LFW images).
7
In summary, all the empirical evidence implies that previous regularizers for adding Lipschitz
constraints can not only decrease the generalization gap but also reduce the information leakage of the
training dataset in terms of the attack performance. Moreover, we observe that spectral normalization
achieves comparable visual quality of the generated images in contrast to the original GAN (see
generated images in Appendix). This suggests that we can attempt to use this technique in various
applications to trade off the information leakage and the visual quality of the generated images.
4.3 Discussions
Attack performance on different datasets. In the experiments, we observe that the attack perfor-
mance may vary on different datasets. From Table 1, in all cases, the attack performance of IDC is
always worse than the performance of LFW. For the original GAN model, the AUC of the attack
model on LFW is 0.729 while the one for IDC is 0.531 which shows a 27.2% relative performance
drop. We infer that the drop is caused by the higher similarity of the images in the IDC data. Quanti-
tatively, the similarity can be measured by the standard deviations (per channel for an RGB image) of
these two datasets. Specifically, the standard deviation of IDC is 0.085 (R-channel) while the value of
LFW is 0.249 (R-channel). The IDC dataset has significantly lower standard deviation than the LFW
dataset. This suggests that an individual example in the IDC dataset will be less likely to noticeably
impact the final model which further constrains an adversary’s ability. Note that similar evidence has
been found in the prior work [31].
Other weight normalization. In the previous experiments, we have employed three regulariz-
ers for limiting the discriminator to be Lipschitz continuous. In addition to these regularizers,
there are some other approaches to use weight normalization techniques to regularize the model
training. The original weight normalization introduced in the work [29] is to normalize the l2
norm of each row vector in a weight matrix. Subsequently, Brock et al. [4] proposed orthonormal
regularization on the weight matrix to stabilize the training of GANs. We also conduct attack
experiments on the GANs trained with these two normalization methods. In practice, the orthonor-
mal regularization achieves comparable performance in terms of the F1 score of the attack model
(0.402 for the IDC dataset), while obtains comparable image quality compared with spectral nor-
malization. In addition, the original weight normalization will lead to training failure (not conver-
gence/mode collapse) in our cases. The failure may be caused by the conflict between the weight
normalizing and the desire to use as many features as possible as discussed in the prior work [22].
Table 2: The results of black-box attack on the LFW
dataset.
Strategy F1 AUC Gap
Original 0.423 0.549 0.581
Weight Clipping 0.358 0.502 0.113
Spectral Normalization 0.347 0.497 0.106
Black-box attack. The aforementioned
analysis is all based on the white-box
attack, i.e., the model structure and
weights of the discriminator and genera-
tor are exposed to the adversary. In this
part, we present some discussions on the
black-box attack. We consider black-box
attacks where the adversary has limited
auxiliary knowledge of the dataset fol-
low the prior work [13]. Specifically, for the LFW dataset, we assume the attacker has 30% images
of both the training and testing datasets (marked as the auxiliary knowledge in the following part).
Then we can use the auxiliary information to build a "fake" discriminator to imitate the behavior
of the original discriminator (more details can be found in the prior work [13]). Once the "fake"
discriminator is obtained, we can replace the original discriminator with the fake one to perform the
aforementioned white-box attack. The results of the black-box attack are summarized in Table 2.
Intuitively, the black-box is a more challenging task than the white-box attack. This can be observed
by the decrease of the attack performance from the white-box to black-box (the AUC decreases from
0.729 to 0.549 for the original model). From Table 2, we can also observe the effectiveness of the
spectral normalization for reducing the information leakage.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown a new perspective of privacy protection to understand the generalization
properties of GANs. Specifically, we have validated the relationship between the generalization
gap and the information leakage of the training dataset both theoretically and quantitatively. This
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new perspective can also help us to understand the effectiveness of previous techniques on Lipschitz
regularizations and the Bayesian GAN. We hope our work can light the following researchers to
leverage our new perspective to design GANs with better generalization ability while preventing the
information leakage.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Before presenting the proof of Theorem 1, we first re-demonstrate the previous lemmas here.
Lemma 3 (Differential privacy ⇒ uniform RO-stability) If a randomized algorithm A is -
differentially private, then the algorithm A satisfies (e − 1)-RO-stability.
Lemma 4 If an algorithm A is uniform RO-stable with rate stable(m), then |FU (A)| can be
bounded: |FU (A)| ≤ stable(m).
Then, we briefly introduce the proof of Theorem 1.
Theorem 3 (Generalization gap) If an algorithm A satisfies -differential privacy, then the general-
ization gap can be bounded by a data-independent constant.
Proof: Given a differentially private algorithm A with a privacy cost , then, according to Lemma 1,
we can derive that A is uniform RO-stability. Then the generalization bound |FU (A)| satisfies the
following inequality:
|FU (A)| ≤ stable (7)
where stable is the stability ratio (equals to e − 1).
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
The proof of Theorem 2 can be accomplished by combing the post-processing property of the
differentially private algorithm and the McDiarmid’s inequality. Thus, we first introduce the post-
processing property and the McDiarmid’s inequality as follows:
Lemma 5 (Post-processing) Let A be a randomized algorithm that is -differently private. Let f be
an arbitrary randomized mapping. Then f ◦ A is -differentially private.
Lemma 6 (McDiarmid’s inequality) Consider independent random variables X1, X2, · · · , Xn ∈
X and a mapping f : Xn → R. If, for all i ∈ 1, 2, · · · , n and for all x1, x2, · · · , xn, x′i ∈ X , the
function φ satisfies:
|φ(x1, · · · , xi−1, xi, xi+1, · · · , xn)− φ(x1, · · · , xi−1, x′i, xi+1, · · · , xn)| ≤ ci (8)
then:
P (|φ(X1, · · · , Xn)| − Eφ| ≥ t) ≤ 2 exp(−−2t
2∑
c2i
) (9)
Theorem 4 (Uniform convergence): Suppose Ad satisfies -differential privacy and d(k)(x; θ(k)d )
be the output of Ad at the k-th iteration. Then, ∀k, the generalization gap with respect to dk can be
bounded by a universal constant which is related to .
Proof: For a training algorithm A which satisfies -differentially private,
then the function build by the output of A is -differentially private in terms of Lemma 3. As a result,
the computation of U(θd, θ∗g) is differentially private. Using Lemma 1, we can derive that U(θd, θ
∗
g)
satisfies uniform RO-stability.
We further let φ = U , then based on the stability of U , we can meet the requirement of Lemma 4.
Based on Lemma 4, we can obtained that:
P (|U(θd, θ∗g)− Uˆ(θd, θ∗g)| ≥ t) ≤ 2 exp(
−2t2
m2
) (10)
where  is the privacy cost and m denotes the number of samples used for computing the empirical
loss Uˆ .
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Table 3: Details of hype-parameters of Adam optimizer.
Strategy Learning rate β1 β2
-JS divergence-
Original 0.0004 0.5 0.999
Weight clipping 0.0004 0.5 0.999
Spectral normalization 0.0004 0.0 0.999
Gradient penalty 0.0004 0.0 0.999
-Wassertain Distance-
W/o clipping 0.0002 0.5 0.999
Weight clipping 0.0002 0.5 0.999
Spectral normalization 0.0002 0.0 0.999
Gradient penalty 0.0002 0.0 0.999
A.3 Hyper-parameter Setting
Here we list the details of the hyper-parameters of different experiments in Table A.3.
A.4 Visualization
Here we show some generated images produced by GANs, which are trained with different regu-
larization techniques. As concluded in the paper, we can see that spectral normalization achieves
comparable quality of generated images in contrast to the original GAN (even better on the LFW
dataset).
Original Clip Spectral
Table 4: Visualization of generated images of GAN models trained with the JS-divergence. The first
row is the results of the LFW dataset and the second row is the IDC dataset.
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